The FOMC in 1986: Flexible Policy for Uncertain limes Philip A. Nuetzel HE Federal Reserve's monetary policy actions during 1986 were influenced by indications of weak economic growth and moderate inflation. The income velocity of money, defined as the ratio of nominal GNP to the narrowly defined money supply Ml, declined even more rapidly in 1986 than it had in the previous year.' lnterest rates declined on balance over 1986, and the Federal Open Market Committee (het-eafter "Committee" or "FOMC") viewed their decline and the associated rapid growth of Ml as a desirable development in light of the sluggish economy. As the year progressed, the Committee deemphasized Ml as a guide to policy while focusing on the broader monetary aggregates, M2 and M3, and several indicators of economic and financial conditions. In the uncertain economic environment that prevailed in 1986, the Comrnittee was flexible in its approach to monetary policy. This article reviews the FOMC's monetar policy decisions during 1986. The Committee's annual growth objectives for the monetary aggregates are discussed in the next section, and the target ranges for 1986 are compared with actual money growth during
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ANNUAL TARGETS FOR 1986
Each February, the Board of Governors appeals before Congress to report on the annual growth targets that the FOMC has established for the monetary and credit aggregates for the coming year. In July, the Board reports on the progress made towai-d meeting these goals and announces the FOMC's provisional growth targets for the following calendar year.
2 The
Committee states its annual targets in tenns of growth ranges from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the current year.' The dates of the three meetings at which the annual target ranges for 1986 were considered are listed in table 1 along with the ranges established for Ml, M2 and M3, and the actual growth rates of these aggregates during 1986.
'These reports are required under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, also known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
'The Committee's use of the fourth quarter of the previous year as the base period for establishing the current year's growth targets leads to an upward drift in money growth if the growth of an aggregate during the previous year exceeded the target range for that year. The "base drift" problem is discussed by Broaddus and Goodfriend (1984) . For a viewpoint that favors base drift, see Walsh (1986) .
July 1985 Meeting
The tentative ranges for 1986 established at the July 1985 FOMC meeting reflected the Committee's feeling, at that time, that continuation of the rapid money growth in the first half of 1985 might be inconsistent with sustainable economic expansion and reasonable price stability. The tentative 1986 range for Ml of 4 to 7 percent was 2 percentage points narrower than the 3 to 8 percent rebased range adopted in July 1985 for the II/1985-1V/1985 period;' the upper limit of the tentative M3 range of 6 to 9 percent was one-half percentage point lower than the upper limit of its 1985 range.
The growth of the three monetary aggregates slowed somewhat during the second half of 1985. Ml growth exceeded the upper limit of its rebased range, however, and its velocity declined even more sharply than it had during the first half.
February 1986 Meeting
The annual growth ranges for 1986 were reconsidered at the Committee's meeting on February 11-12, 1986 . For Ml growth, the Committee chose a target range of 3 to 8 percent, which was based on expectations that Ml growth would slow while nominal GNP growth would accelerate. This range was 2 percentage points wider than the FOMC had tentatively planned, reflecting continuing uncertainty about the future behavior of Ml and its velocity. The Board's report to Congress stated that:
The width of the Ml range reflects continuing uncertainty about the behavior' of Ml under varying economic and financial circumstances.,., While the range for Ml is wide enough to allow for some variation in behavior of the aggregate's income velocit in response to changing conditions, the range was set on the assumption that there would not he a large drop in velocity, such as occurred in 1985. tn that connection, the Committee will evaluate behavior of Ml in light of its consistency with other monetaty aggregates, economic and financial developments, and the potential for inflationary pressures.'
The 6 to 9 percent ranges for M2 and M3 established tentatively in July were affirmed by the Committee at Because of the apparent decline in Ml velocity during the first halfof 1985, the FOMC decided in July 1985 that the annual range originally established for Ml growth was undesirable. The Committee voted to move the base period of that range from IV/1 984 to lI/I 985. See Hafer (1986) for a discussion of the decision to rebase the Ml range and the influence that declining Ml velocity had on the FOMC's decisions in general during 1985.
'Report (April1986), p. 214. the February meeting. The growth of these broadetaggregates had been within their target ranges in 1985, and it was observed that 'on balance over the past few years, the behavior of M2 and M3 seemed to have been less affected by institutional and interest rate changes."
July 1986 Meeting
Over the first halfof 1986, the growth rates of M2 and M3 were roughly in the middle of their target ranges. Ml growth slowed in the first quarter from its pace in 1985, but accelerated sharply in the second quarter, leaving its annualized growth rate from December through June at 13.3 percent, more than S percentage points above the upper bound of the Committee's target range for the year. Other evidence reviewed by the Committee at the meeting of July 8-9. 1986, suggested that the rate of economic growth had slowed considerably in the second quarter from the 2.9 percent growth of real GNP registered in 1/1986.' Further-'Record (June 1986), p. 410. The Committee also adopted a monitoring range for the growth of total domestic nonfinancial debt of 8 to 11 percent. 'Revisions showed that real GNP grew at a rate of 3.8 percent in /1986 and 0.6 percent in Il/i 986. All of the data used in the text in discussing the Committee's deliberations are those that were available to the Committee at the time.
more, wage and price increases continued to moderate over the first half of the year, even when the direct effects of declines in food and energy prices were eliminated.
The Committee reaffirmed the long-run growth ranges of 6 to 9 percent for M2 and M3. In their discussion of the range for Ml growth, however, the members again emphasized uncertainties affecting the outlook for Ml velocity and the changes in Ml's composition resulting from the rapid growth of its deregulated, interest-bearing component. Interest rates had declined by 1 to 2 percentage points during the first half and were thought to be associated with the rapid growth of Ml. Some members thought that the Ml range should be eliminated, "at least pending the reestablishment of a more predictable relationship with overall measures of economic activity." A majority, however, preferred to retain a range for Ml "even though they believed its operational significance could only be judged in the perspective of concurrent economic and financial developments, including the behavior of M2 and M3." Rather than raising or rebasing the existing Ml range, the Committee acknowledged its desire to accommodate uncertain changes in Ml demand by agreeing that, after accounting for the behavior of the broader aggregates and other developments, including trends in interest rates, growth of Ml in excess of 8 percent would be acceptable for 1986.
Actual Money Growth in 1986
The actual growth rates of the monetary aggregates for 1986 are reported at the bottom of table 1. Ml growth of 15.3 percent was 7.3 percentage points above the upper' bound of its range set early in the year. This growth rate represents a significant acceleration from the already rapid 12.1 percent growth of Ml from IV/1984 to lV/1985. In comparison, Ml's average annual growth rate over the 1960-84 period was only 5.8 percent.
One reason why the Committee accepted the rapid Ml growth during 1986 was that the growth rates of M2 and M3 were quite close to the 9 percent upper limit of their target ranges for the year. M2 growth of 8.9 percent and M3 growth of 8.7 percent were slightly more rapid than their respective growth rates of 8.7
'Record (October 1986), p. 708. 'Ibid. percent and 7.7 percent over the IV/1984-IV/1985 period. The Committee felt, however, that the behavior of these aggregates was generally consistent with its overall policy objectives. The Board's mid-year report to Congress stated that "during a period of greater overall price stability and adequate capacity relative to the demands placed upon it," monetary policy had been able "to accommodate demands for money and credit, helping facilitate further declines in interest rates...."
THE FOMC's GUIDES FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The Committee's use of a variable as a policy guide is based on assumptions about the effect of that variable on real economic growth and the rate of inflation, which are of ultimate concern, as well as the ability of policy actions to influence that variable. As noted previously, the deemphasis of Ml as a policy guide was a reaction to the instability of Ml velocity. In this section, we review the Committee's explanation for the unusually rapid growth of Ml relative to nominal GNP and its reasons for believing that the relationship between Ml and economic activity would be subject to a high degree of uncertainty for some time. We then discuss the Committee's reasons for continuing to use other variables as policy guides, such as M2 and M3, the level of interest rates, the foreign exchange value of the dollar, real GNP and indicators of output and prices -
Institutional Changes and Ml
In accounting for the rapid growth of Ml in 1986, the Committee emphasized that the composition of Ml had changed in part because of the deregulation of deposit interest rates and minimum balance requirements that had taken place under the Monetary Contr-ol Act of 1980 and the Cam-St. Germain Act of 1982 ." From 1980 example, the proportion of intel-est-beanng checkable deposits (other checkable deposits, or OCDsI in Ml rose from 5.5 percent to 27.6 percent, a trend that continued in 1986. Table 2 shows the annualized growth rates of Ml and its three major components for each quarter of "Report (September 1986), p. 603. "For a discussion of federal policy on deposit interest rate ceilings, or Regulation 0, and the phaseout of deposit regulation, see Gilbert (1986) .
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The Committee attributed much of the rapid growth of OCFJs and demand deposits, and hence declining Ml velocity in 1936, to declining interest rates and subsiding inflationary expectations. In the midyear report to Congress, the Board stressed that "the advent and expansion of interest-bearing checking accounts over the years have attracted more savings-type balances and have increased the responsiveness of Ml to interest rate changes,~" Commenting on the rapid growth of demand deposits~Chair-man Paul Voicker said that there were "some indications of a greater-willingness of businesses to hold demand deposits at a time of lower interest rates, partly because, with interest rates down, a larger balance is necessary to compensate banks for' a given amount of services," Chart 1 shows the paths of selected short-term 2Report (September 1986). p. 614. Support for the view that the interest elasticity of money demand has increased with deposit deregulation can be found in Keeley and Zimmerman (1986) , Roth (1985) , Mehra (1985) and Wenninger (1986) . "Volcker (1986), p.6 4 0.
interest rates and the growth of Ml over 1985 and 1986. There were major accelerations in Ml growth accompanied by declining short-term rates during the spring of 1985, the late winter and spring of 1986, and the summer of 1986. On the other hand, there were also accelerations of Ml growth during periods of r'elatively stable interest rates in the summer and the late fall of 1985, and the fall of 1986. The consensus at the Committee's meeting in July 1986 was that rapid Ml growth during the first half of the year reflected lagged adjustments to declining inflationary expectations and interest rates; it did not seem to hold the usual potential for reigniting inflationary pressures when judged in the context of other developments, including more restrained growth of the broader aggregates."
While the Committee thought that Ml still had some informational value, it did not wish to restrain the process of adjustment that it felt was responsible for rapid Ml growth and declining velocity. Chairman Volcker stated in July 1986 that ". -. a firm conclusion concerning the nature and stability of future velocity characteristics may take years of experience in the new institutional and economic setting." The Chairman went on to summarize the Committee's attitude toward the use of Ml as a policy tool:
"See the Record (October 1986), p. 708. "Voloker (1986), p. 641.
1986 and for-the year as a whole. The OCD component of Ml grew at 28.6 percent, 6.4 percentage points faster than its 1985 growth rate. Gr-owth in demand deposits was also quite rapid, accelerating from 8.9 percent in 1985 to 11.6 percent in 1986. Growth of the public's currency holdings was unchanged at 7.5 percent.
Chort 1

Short4erm~nterest Rates and Ml Growth
Ml growth rotes ore compounded onnuol rotes of chonge of four-week moving overoges of Ml from four weeks previous.
Experience over' the fir-st half of 1986 underscored the difficulty -I would say impossibility -of conducting monetary policy in current circumstances according to one or two simple, preset criteria .,. the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that Ml a/one dur'ing this per-iod of economic and institutional transition is not today a reliable measur-e of future price pressures or indeed a good short-term "leading indicator" of business acuvityl. The more restr-ained performance of the hr'oadem' aggregates, as well as rhe performance of the economy and prices themselves, point in a different direction."
M2 and M3
In recent years, the velocity behavior-of M2 and M3 "Ibid., p. 642.
have not changed as radically as M1's.Apparentlv, the shifts in asset holdings resulting from the combination of falling interest rates and deposit deregulation have occurr-ed largely within the broader aggregates and have not led to as large a surge in their growth as in Ml's.
The FOMC has responded by assigning more weight to M2 and M3 as policy guides." In 1986, the Commit-"Monetary policy actions have a weaker influence on the broader aggregates than on Ml, however, because most of the non-Mi deposit liabilities included in M2 and M3 are not subject to reserve requirements. Moreover, information on these aggregates is available at a longer lag. See Lawler (1981) . Also, Hater (1981) presents empirical evidence suggesting that M2 is less controllable through policy actions than Ml.
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tee often evaluated potential changes in policy on the basis of the recent growth of these aggregates, among other factors. For example, in April, the Committee viewed the growth of M2 and M3 at rates within their' target ranges as evidence that the rapid growth of Ml did not represent an excessive buildup of liquidity." At later meetings. when M2 and M3 were near the upper limits of their ranges, members expressed mor'e concern about the implications of accommodative policy for inflation."
Interest Rates
The Committee also evaluated potential changes in its policy stance during 1986 in the context of recent movements in interest rates. By implementing an accommodative policy in 1986, the Committee sought to provide the reserves necessary to support increases in money demand." At two meetings, though it felt that "Seethe Record (September 1986), pp. 649-50. "See the following Records: November 1986, pp. 784-85; January 1987, pp. 34-35; February 1987, pp. 120-21 .
"See Report (September 1986), pp. 612-1 3.
less restrictive reserve conditions were desirable, the Committee contemplated that the easing would be achieved through discount rate reductions by the Board. This was expected to facilitate a market tendencv toward lower interest rates." Moreover, the appropriateness of potential intermeeting adjustments in the provision of reserves were viewed as conditional on near-term changes in rates, including potential discount rate reductions.
While it sought to promote easier-credit market conditions, the Committee also took account of movements in long-term interest rates as indicators of changes in inflationary expectations. For example, an increase in interest rates before the September meeting, together with some other developments, was interpr-eted as a sign of an increase in expected inflation. This was one factor that led to a vote for "maintaining unchanged conditions of reserve availability," and one 
International Developments
Concerns about the external sector-also influenced the FOMC's policy actions in 1986. The foreign exchange value of the dollar had declined substantially on a trade-weighted basis since early 1985. As a result, the trade deficit was expected to decline during 1986, hut it widened instead and was a continuing element of uncertainty in the economic outlook. Throughout the year'. the Committee expressed doubts about the timing and magnitude of any improvement in the tr'ade balance because it believed that foreign producers would attempt to maintaln their U.S. market shares by reducing their' profit margins." The Committee also felt that increases in U.S. net exports would be hindered by sluggish growth in the economies of some major U.S. trading partners in the absence of most stimulative policies abroad?
While the falling dollar-improved the prospects for a smaller trade deficit, Committee members noted that it also had a potential inflationary impact." Furthermore, the trade deficit implied large capital inflows from abroad that were financing domestic economic activity, toss of confidence in the dollar might require sharp increases in domestic interest rates to maintain the inflow of foreign capi.tal: members of the Committee often mentioned this risk to economic expansion." In general, the Committee felt that greater caution should be exercised in providing reserves in the event of sharp dollar depreciation during inter-meeting periods." "See the Record (January 1987), p. 34. " Mann (1986) 
Real Activity and Prices
Finally, the FOMC's decisions in 1986 were guided by available data on production, employment, wages and prices, and projections of economic activity based on recent developments. Consumer prices rose by only 1.1 percent in 1986, the lowest rate of inflation by this measure since 1965. Steep declines in oil prices earl in the year contributed to the low rate of inflation, hut wage and price pressures were otherwise quite moderate. Monthly data on production and employment and the growth of real GNP indicated, overmuch of the year, that the expansion was proceeding at a slower pace than the Committee had anticipated? Throughout the year, the members generally anticipated more rapid real growth and inflation in later quarters. Nevertheless, current indications of sluggish growth, moderate price pressures and downside risks in the economic outlook weighed heavily in the Committee's decisions to maintain the accommodative stance of policy." The Committee's views on the desirability of inter-meeting adjustments in policy implementation also depended upon indications of the pace of economic growth and inflation, among other developments."
SHORT-RUN POLICY OBJECTIVES
The FOMC meets eight times each year to review economic developments and discuss the status of policy and its implementation. At each meeting, the Committee's decisions are summarized in a directive isstred to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The directive is then used b the Manager for Domestic Operations, System Open Market Account, to guide the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy thr'ough open-market operations during the intermeeting period.
Recent policy directives speci~' the Committee's decision about the appropriate "degree of pressure on reserve positions" of depository institutions for the "Real GNP grew 2.1 percent over the IV/1985 IV/ -lV/1986 
A" ANN- ; ,-/ ,A,''/'A' 
February Meeting
The economic data reviewed at the February meeting indicated a moderate and, perhaps, improving rate of economic growth. Real GNP grew at an annual rate of 2.4 percent in 1V/1985, which was slower than its 3 percent growth in the previous quarter. Several indicators of real activity, however, such as industrial production, housing starts and new orders for nondefense capital goods had shown strength in December after performing sluggishly in prior months. Moreover, substantial gains in employment were reported for January.
The Committee discussed a number of uncertainties that clouded the outlook at the February meeting. The sharp decline in oil prices in early 1986 was expected to have broadly favorable effects on the economy. These effects were difficult to assess, however, and energy-producing regions of the country and some oil-producing, developing countries with large debt burdens were likely to suffer. While prospective fiscal restraint associated with deficit reduction under the Gramm-Rudman-Flollings legislation was thought to have had a beneficial impact on financial markets, it was expected to have adverse effects on aggregate demand. Some members expressed concern over the strength of business investment in light of the uncertainties surrounding tax reform legislation, which was likely to tilt the composition of tax liabilities toward businesses and away from households.
Despite these considerations, members generally agreed that the economy was likely to grow at a faster rate during 1986 than it had in 1985. Some of the positive factors cited were the effects of rapid Ml growth, lower inter'est rates, higher stock prices and further declines in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. In fact, some members felt that inflationary pressures might crop up sever-al quarters ahead.
The growth of Ml and MS had slowed in the weeks prior to the February meeting, and money growth was close to the rate expected by the Committee in December for the November-to-March period. While that fact was encouraging, some members were concerned about the failure of short-term interest rates to decline further in recent months in response to the relatively accommodative stance of monetary policy that had prevailed for some time. There was gener-al accord on the desirability of implementing policy "in a manner that would not in itself signal or encourage higher interest rates or impede the tendency for some market rates to decline."" There was, however, a perceived risk of "a cumulating decline in the exchange rate that might discourage willingness to hold dollars at declining interest rates. In these circumstances, nearly all participants agreed that little or no change in reserve availability was warranted."
The Committee viewed its policy stance as accommodative, but some members felt that further easing might be necessary in light of the risks of a weakening economy. In fact, "the point was made that the discount rate might need to be reduced to permit or accommodate a market tendency toward lower interest rates and that such a move would be a desirable complement to open market operations..."" On the other hand, members felt that the desirability of a reduction in the discount rate would depend on evolving circumstances and the prospects for-similar action by major foreign central banks?
April Meeting
Interest rates of all maturities declined during the period between the February and April meetings, with long-term rates falling more sharply than short-term rates. The foreign exchange value of the dollar also declined on balance. At the time of the April meeting, however, there were conflicting signals about the pace of economic activity. Spending and real output were thought to have grown more rapidly during the first quartem-than in the sluggish fourth quarter." On the other hand, growth was clearly weak in some key sectors, and production and employment data for February were disappointing. On the bright side, declines in oil prices dominated the inflation outlook, and were viewed as instrumental in lowering inflationary expectations.
'I'he Committee decided to maintain "about the existing degree of pm-essure on reserve conditions~."T his was felt to he c:onsistent with the long-run objec-"Record (June 1986), pp. 411-12. "Ibid., p. 411.
"Ibid. "The Federal Reserve announced a reduction of the discount rate from 71/2 to 7 percent on March 7. Subsequently, this action was matched by several foreign central banks. "The Commerce Department had reported a downward revision in real GNP growth in IV/1 985 to 0.7 percent.
"Record (July 1986), p. 482.
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tives for growth in the monetary aggregates -'rhe growth of Ml had accelerated in February and March, and was near the upper end of the Committee's annual range, but the growth of the broader aggregates had been moderate. The Committee discussed the possibility that demands for Ml balances could grow substantially if inter-est rates continued to decline. Furthermore, the velocity of Ml remained weak, and some members suggested that a more accommodative posture with respect to money and reserve gr-owth might well become desirable. For the weeks immediately ahead, however, "most of the members felt that there should be no presumptions about the likely direction of any intermeeting adjustments."'
The Board announced another reduction in the discount rate of one-half point, to 6'/z percent, effective April 21. The Committee held a telephone confeience on that date and agreed to make no changes in the current directive. Recent data indicated that growth in the monetary aggregates had accelerated, however, and the members felt that, in implementing open market operations, "a degree of caution should be exercised to avoid an impression that a further change in the discount rate was sought over the period immediately ahead."
May Meeting
'rhe acceleration in the growth of Ml continued, and the appropriateness of using that aggregate as a guide to policy was prominent in the discussion at the Committee's meeting on May 20. As of early May, Ml was well above the 8 percent upper limit of its target range for 1986. Some members noted that the relatively rapid growth of Ml balances needed to he accommodated in light of the continuing adjustments to earlier declines in inflationary expectations and interest rates and some indications of weakness in the economy."
Other members suggested that the rapid money growth might represent excessive growth in liquidity that eventuallywould have inflationary consequences. In this view, rapidly growing cash balances "were available to support a considei-able pickup in spend-"Ibid. "Ibid., p. 483.
"The Commerce Department's preliminary estimate of real GNP growth in the first quarter was 3.7 percent, but industrial production declined on balance over the three months ending in April. Moreover, weakness among oil producers and uncertain but potentially adverse changes in the tax code were retarding business fixed investment.
ing at some point in the future." The growth of the broader aggregates had been well within their respective target ranges for 1986, howevemA which "raised questions as to whether-the growth of Ml i-eally represented a potentially excessive buildup in liquidity or was more of a shift in the composition of liquid holdings in response to relative movements in interest rates.'" The members generally agreed that some slowing in Ml growth was likely in the weeks ahead, but, because of uncertainties about the timing and extent of the slowdown, 'some proposed omitting numerical references in the directive to the Committee's expectations for monetary growth in the second quarter."' This pi-oposal was rejected by the majority.
While some evidence of slower real gr-owth had emerged by the time of the May meeting, a number-of factors pointed toward more rapid growth later in the year. These factors included rapid money growth, higher prices of financial assets, lower energy prices and further depreciation of the dollar against the currencies of major-trading partners. In response to these elements in the outlook, 'most of the members indicated that they were in favor of continuing to direct open market operations at least initially toward maintaining the existing degree of reserve availability."~In their discussion of possible intermeeting adjustments, most members emphasized a potential need for restraint in response to signals of a strengthening economy if growth in the monetary aggregates did not slow as anticipated. The directive stated that, under those circumstances, "somewhat greater reserve restraint would be acceptable," hut in the event of slower money growth and sluggish economic activity, "somewhat lesser reserve restraint might he acceptable."'
July Meeting
Some optimism was expressed at the July meeting about the pi-ospects for economic growth over the second half, arid the outlook for inflation remained favorable. Ther'e was concern, however, about the "Record (September 1986), p. 648. "Ibid., p. 649. "Ibid., p. 650. "Ibid., p. 650. "Ibid.. pp. 651-52. In response to rapid growth in required reserves and currency in circulation, the limit on changes in System Account holdings of U.S. government and federal agency securities between Committee meetings was temporarily raised by the Committee from $3 billion to $9 billion on June 18.
sluggish pace of business investment, the lack of improvement in the trade balance, and the "sharp contrasts in the economic performance of different sectors and regions of the country and ---strains on financial institutions that serviced the depressed industries."'
At the previous meeting, the members had anticipated that a move toward restraint might be necessary. By July, the favorable inflation outlook and concern over slow economic growth led most of the members to believe "that some easing was desirable," which they preferred to implement "at least initially, through a lower discount rate rather than through open market operations." The members accepted a directive "that called for some decrease in the existing degree of reserve pressure, recognizing that relaxation could be accomplished in the first instance by a reduction in the discount rate."'
The Committee continued to anticipate a slowdown in the growth of Ml, which had decelerated somewhat in June but was still quite rapid (see chart 1). Considerable doubt remained about the extent and timing of such a slowdown, however. With the growth of the broader aggregates around the midpoints of their ranges for the year, and in the context of an unexpectedly sluggish economy, the Committee members agreed that rigid adherence to the original Ml target was inconsistent with their objectives. Because of their uncertainty about the usefulness of Ml as a guide to policy under prevailing conditions, "a majority of the members expressed a preference for not indicating a specific rate of expected growth for Ml in the short-mn operational paragraph of the Committee's directive."
August Meeting
The rapid growth of Ml continued through July and into early August. The broader aggregates also grew "Record (October 1986), p. 707. "Ibid., p. 710. Of course, a cut in the discount rate should increase the demand for borrowed reserves by depository institutions. Under the borrowed reserve operating procedure currently used by the openmarket desk, this would result in open-market purchases of securities unless the borrowed reserves target is increased. See Gilbert (1985) for a discussion of the current operating procedure and two others that have been used by the open-market desk since 1970. The borrowed reserves targets used by the desk during each year are published during the following year in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterfr Review.
"Record (October 1986), p. 710. On July 10, the Federal Reserve announced a '/2-point reduction in the discount rate to 6 percent.
"Ibid.
quite rapidly, leaving them near the upper limits of their target ranges. At the Committee's August meeting, there was some concern about whether the rapid growth in all three aggregates had inflationary implications. Moreover, there had been further depreciation in the foreign exchange value of the dollar during the intermeeting period. The cheaper dollar was expected to put some upward pressure on prices, even though there were not yet any signs of the longawaited reduction in the trade deficit. There was some evidence that economic growth was accelerating from the weak pace of the second quarter, including strong consumption demand and housing activity." Nevertheless, the data reviewed at this meeting continued to indicate a lack of balance in terms of growth among different sectors of the economy and only moderate wage and price pressures. In view of the fact that interest rates had resumed their decline since early June, the members agreed that money growth had not been excessive.
The members considered a number of uncertainties that continued to cloud the economic outlook in August. These included downside risks related to the effects of tax reform legislation, rising consumer debt burdens and sluggish growth of the economies of several major U.S. trading partners. There was also uncertainty about the course of the federal budget deficit and its impact on the economy.
The Committee agreed that "some slight easing in the degree of r-esen'e pressure" was appropriate, and once again stated that this "might be accomplished through a reduction in the discount rate." The members felt that an intermeeting adjustment in either the direction of ease or r-estraint might be warranted, depending on ensuing developments. It was noted, however, that in the event of a further cut in the discount rate, a significant depreciation of the dollar on foreign exchange markets would call for "a little greater caution in the provision of reserves through open market operations "The Board reduced the discount rate by '/z percentage point to 5'/z percent effective August 21.
September Meeting
Short-term interest rates fell somewhat after the reduction in the discount rate, but long-term rates "The preliminary estimate of real GNP growth in 11/1986 was 1.1 percent. "Record (November1986), p. 785. "Ibid. rose sharply, and by the time of the Committee's meeting on September 23, the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets had changed little. The growth rates of M2 and M3 decelerated in August but were still fairly rapid, and Ml growth accelerated from its already rapid pace before slowing sharply in early September.
Most Committee members believed that, despite an apparently stronger economy in the third quarter, an improvement in the trade balance was critical to sustained growth.At the same time, the members felt that there were compelling reasons for expecting some upward price pressures in the quarters ahead, including the likelihood of price increases for imports and import-competing goods stemming from the decline of the dollar, and a continuing reversal of the earlier decline in world oil prices. In addition, there had been indications of a resurgence of inflationary expectations in financial markets and in markets for precious metals. Because "monetary policy had moved toward an increasingly accommodative posture over the course of recent months," several members believed "that it was now time to pause and observe developments " The Committee voted for "no change in the current degree of pressure on reserve positions."' In fact, while not ruling out the possibility of a move toward ease, most of the members believed that any potential intermeeting adjustment would more likely involve some restraint, depending on the behavior of a number of guides reflecting economic and financial conditions.
November Meeting
The Committee's expectation that money growth would fall somewhat from its exceptionally rapid pace during the summer months was fulfilled in September and October: M2 and M3 advanced at annual rates of 9.3 and 8 percent over the two months, and Ml growth slowed to a rate of12.5 percent. Meanwhile, economic activity appeared to be growing at a moderate rate."
At the Committee's November meeting, the members saw a continuation in the moderate pace of economic expansion as a likely outcome, but certain aspects of the outlook were disturbing. Improvement "Record (January 1987), p. 34.
"Ibid., p. 35. "Real GNP grew at an annual rate of 2.4 percent in 111/1986, according to the preliminary estimate, after growth of only 0.6 percent in Il/i 986. "Record (February 1987), p. 120. in the trade balance remained elusive and, in large part, dependent upon stronger economic growth overseas to spur demands for U.S. exports. One member referred to increasing protectionist sentiment as a threat to real growth and price stability. In addition, tax reform legislation appeared to be deterring business investment, particularly in structures.
The Committee expected inflation to accelerate somewhat over the quarters ahead because of the lagged impacts of the dollar's depreciation and energy price developments. On the other hand, relatively low rates of capacity utilization in most industries, moderate wage growth and continuing efforts by businesses to reduce costs and improve productivity were factors that would help to hold inflation in check. Moreover, the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets had stabilized during the intermeeting period. If continued, that stability would limit a potential source of upward price pressure.
Given the prospects for sustained, moderate growth in economic activity and recent moderation in the growth of the monetary aggregates, the Committee voted for "maintaining unchanged conditions of reserve availability."' With regard to possible intermeeting adjustments, some members felt that an easing might be desirable in the context of indications of weakness in the economy, while others felt that money growth below the Committee's expectations should be tolerated in the absence of rising interest rates or a weak economy. The directive did not incorporate any presumption, however, about the likely direction of any intermeeting adjustment in policy."
December Meeting
The data reviewed at the Committee's December meeting showed that employment growth, industrial production and consumer spending had strengthened in recent months. Sluggishness in business spending and the housing sector were elements of concern, however, and the balance of trade showed no convincing signs of improvement. To a considerable extent, the discussion focused on downside risks to economic growth, particularly for the early part of 1987. The earlier decline of the dollar had enhanced the international competitiveness of many U.S. firms, "The Committee approved a temporary increase from $6 billion to $7 billion in the limit on changes in System Account holdings of government securities during the next intermeeting period, effective December 3. Outright purchases through December 1 had left insufficient leeway for additional purchases that would be necessary to provide for seasonal increases in required reserves and currency in circulation.
but a number of members expected only minor improvement in foreign trade over the quarters ahead. The growth of consumer debt was viewed as a factor that might inhibit domestic demand in 1987. Moreover, consumers and businesses were thought to have shifted some purchases originally planned for 1987 into 1986 to take advantage of certain pi-ovisions of the tax code that were scheduled for rescission under the new tax legislation." While the reduction in personal tax rates fom 1987 was good news for consumers, the new tax code along with high vacancy rates had negative implications for spending on multifamily housing and nonresidential construction.
In their discussion of policy implementation, the members noted that the broader monetary aggregates, whose growth had slowed in November, were within their target ranges for the year. On the othei hand, the growth of Ml had accelerated in November. Some members felt that a continuation of the rapid growth of that aggregate. and the reserves needed to support it, carried an inflationary risk. There was a strong likelihood, however, that Ml velocity would continue to decline even with some slowing in Ml growth. Once again, the Committee agreed that the growth of Ml would be appraised in the context of the growth of the broader aggregates and other developments.
Given the economic outlook and the fact that M2 and M3 were within their long-mn ranges, the Committee directed the desk "to maintain the existing degree of pressure on reserve positions." In light of the downside risks to the economy, several members emphasized that in subsequent weeks, developments might call for some easing of reserve conditions. 'rhese member-s noted that flexibility in the direction of ease was afforded by the recent firming of the dollar-s value. Members recognized, however, that circumstances might call for a small adjustment in either direction.
The Committee's deemphasis of Ml as an intermediate target and guide for policy was underscored at the December meeting. A tentative range of 3 to 8 percent for Ml growth in 1987 had been reported to Congress in Jul as more tentative than usual. In December, a majority of the Committee indicated that they opposed 'establishing a formal target range for Ml growth in 1987." Many of those members believed, however, that Ml growth "should continue to he monitored or evaluated in light of information about the economy, prices, and the broad monetary aggregates and other financial variables." 
CONCLUSION
The FOMC deemphasized Ml and placed relatively more weight on the broader monetary aggregates and various economic and financial indicators in estabfishing its overall approach to policy and in guiding short-run policy implementation during 1986. A statement typical of the 1986 directives issued by the Committee was that changes in the direction of policy implementation would depend 'on the behavior of the aggregates, taking into account the strength of the business expansion, developments in foreign exchange markets, progress against inflation, and conditions in domestic and international credit markets." The lengthy list of factors guiding policy underscored the Committee's desire to take a flexible approach in providing reserves in what it viewed as a highly uncertain economic environment.
The recent changes in the relative weights attached to various policy guides have reflected the Committee's evaluation of the importance and reliability of these variables in influencing real growth and inflation. The accommodative thrust of policy was motivated by sluggish economic growth and a number of risks to sustained expansion. While the Committee was wary of inflationary risks in the outlook, puce pressures over the course of 1986 were wellcontained. Whether monetary policy can continue to provide sufficient liquidity to sustain economic growth without an acceleration in the i-ate of inflation is a major issue confronting the Federal Reserve in 1987
